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We analyze the effects of high standards food chains on household welfare taking into 
account general equilibrium effects and market imperfections. To measure structural 
production changes and welfare effects on rural and urban households, our model has two 
types of agents, five kinds of products and four types of factors. We calibrate the model using 
dataset from China. The simulation results show that how poor rural households are affected 
depends on a variety of factors, including the nature of the shocks leading to the expansion of 
high standards sector, production technologies, trade effects, spillover effects on low 
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1. Introduction 
  A series of recent studies have identified the spread of ‘high standards’ as having a 
fundamental impact on the process of development (Farina and Reardon, 2000; Fulponi, 2007; 
Henson et al., 2000; McCluskey, 2007; Swinnen, 2007). The growing demand of wealthy 
consumers for high quality, safety, health, and ethical standards put pressure on governments 
to increase public regulatory standards and on private processing and retailing companies to 
introduce or tighten private corporate standards (Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2008). 
Generally, growing demand for high standards is a natural consequence of income growth. In 
recent years it has been reinforced by several additional events. For example, international 
campaigns against child labor and genetically modified food, NGO activities for the 
environment and several food safety crises, such as the food dioxin crisis and the appearance 
of BSE in Europe, have all contributed to a rising demand for high quality, safe and traceable 
products in the production chains of many nations.
1 
  Although high standards emerged initially in rich countries, they now affect poorer 
countries through several channels. First, standards in richer countries are also imposed on 
imports and consequently have an impact on producers and traders in exporting nations 
(Jaffee and Henson, 2004; Unnevehr, 2000). Second, global supply chains are playing an 
increasingly important role in world food markets and the growth of these vertically 
coordinated marketing channels is facilitated by increasing standards (Swinnen, 2007). For 
example, modern retailing companies increasingly dominate international and local markets 
in fruits and meats, including those in poorer countries, and have begun to set standards for 
                                                        
1 This paper focuses on the development implications of changes in the demand for product standards. There 
are several related areas of the literature on standards, including a.) analyzes of asymmetric information 
problems which may be reasons for companies or public regulators to introduce standards (Fulton and 
Giannakas, 2004; Gardner, 2003); b.) studies on the role of standards in reducing consumption externalities 
(Copeland and Taylor, 1995; Besley and Ghatak, 2007); c.) the role of standards in providing non-tariff trade 
protection (Anderson et al. 2004; Fischer and Serra 2000), and (d) the political economy of standards (Swinnen 
and Vandemoortele, 2008). 
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food quality and safety in this sector wherever they are doing business (Dolan and Humphrey, 
2000; Henson et al., 2000). Third, rising investment in processing and retailing in developing 
countries is translated into higher standards, as buyers are making new demands on local 
producers in order to serve the high-end income consumers or to minimize transaction costs 
in supply chains (Reardon et al., 2003).   
  Early studies argued that the penetration of international marketing chains was much 
more widespread than people originally thought (e.g., Gulati et al., 2007; World Bank, 2005) 
and predicted that the implications of these developments would be vast: a new development 
paradigm was emerging (Reardon and Timmer, 2005). 
  Importantly, the early literature also posited that the rise of standards could have sharp 
negative influences on equity and poverty. Several of the studies argued that modern supply 
chains in developing countries systematically exclude the poor and negatively affect the 
incomes of small farmers; unlike other waves of rising economic activity, the poor would 
suffer from this process (Farina and Reardon, 2000). For example, studies in Latin America 
and Africa argued that small farmers were being left behind in the supermarket-driven 
horticultural marketing and trade (Dolan and Humphrey; 2001; Humphrey et al., 2004; Key 
and Runsten, 1999; Reardon et al., 2003; Weatherspoon et al., 2001). In a study on Kenya, 
Minot and Ngigi (2004) demonstrated that modern marketing chains put intense pressure on 
smallholders (although smallholders were still participating). Even more extreme, in the case 
of Côte d’Ivoire, almost all of the fruit and vegetables being produced for exports were being 
cultivated on large industrial estates owned by wealthy capitalists. Likewise, Weatherspoon 
and Reardon (2003) reported that the rise of supermarkets in Southern Africa failed to help 
small producers who were almost completely excluded from dynamic urban markets due to 
quality and safety standards.       
  In contrast, recent research suggests a more nuanced picture of the effect of the 4 
 
international marketing chains on poverty and development. For example, Dries and Swinnen 
(2004) and Dries, et al. (2009) find that high standards lead to increased vertical coordination 
in supply chains which improves access to credit, technology and quality inputs for poor 
farmers in Eastern Europe. Minten et al. (2007) and Maertens and Swinnen (2009) also find 
increased vertical coordination in newly emerging supply chains between buyers and farms in 
African countries, such as Madagascar and Senegal. According to their results, poor rural 
households experienced measurable gains from supplying high standards horticulture 
commodities to global retail chains. In China, researchers find that while rising urban 
incomes and the emergence of a relatively wealthy middle class are associated with an 
enormous rise in the demand for fruits and vegetables and sharp shifts in the downstream 
segment of the food chain towards ‘modern retailing’, almost all of the increased supply is 
being produced by small, relatively poor farmers that sell to small, relatively poor traders. 
(Wang et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2008) 
An important shortcoming of this literature – in addition to empirical problems – is the 
absence of a consistent and comprehensive conceptual framework for interpreting the 
empirical findings. Related to this, very few of the empirical studies actually measure welfare 
or poverty effects. The vast majority of these studies analyze which farmers are supplying to 
the high standards market and/or the impacts on productivity or investments of supplying 
farms. The only studies that actually examine poverty effect are Maertens and Swinnen (2009) 
and Maertens et al. (2008). They find strong poverty reducing effects of high standards 
exports in Senegal. In addition, they show that much of the welfare benefits for the poor 
come through the labor market, which is ignored by most other studies.   
Moreover, no studies analyze other general equilibrium effects such as demand and 
supply spillover effects on other markets, such as staple foods, which may have very 
important impacts in developing countries.    Measuring these effects econometrically is very 5 
 
difficult because annually collected datasets usually do not contain the necessary data on high 
standards market and datasets from surveys targeted to measure impacts of the growth of high 
standards typically do not have sufficient information (either spacially or dynamically) to 
measure spillover effects on other markets. Hence for all these reasons a CGE approach can 
make a very important contribution to this literature.   
The objective of this paper is therefore to model the process through which high 
standards production and consumption affects development while explicitly taking into 
account general equilibrium effects and market imperfections.  The model has both a low 
standard and high standard supply chain and we explicitly integrate key characteristics of 
many developing and emerging economies, such as capital constrains and labor market 
imperfections. We use the model to analyze how and through which channels welfare of rural 
and urban households is affected. 
Because of many general equilibrium interactions the model is too complex to solve 
analytically. Therefore we use simulations to show the effects. For this, we calibrate the 
model with data from China. The development of high standards food sector in China is 
particularly relevant for three reasons. First, even though China has sustained high growth 
rates for nearly thirty years and the continuously increasing income per capita leads to 
structural change of Chinese diet (Gale and Huang, 2007), the food distribution system 
remained laggard until very recently. However, recent years are characterized by the fast 
rising supermarkets and some food safety scandals (Hu et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2007). Yet 
the transition from a system occupied mainly by low standards food produced by millions of 
small farms (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004) to one mainly by high standards food is only now 
starting and will undoubtedly have huge impact on both producers and consumers. Second, 
despite high growth rates, an increasing inequality between wealthy and poor households 
becomes a more and more acute issue (Ravallion, 2001). After the initially fast decrease of 6 
 
poverty rate, in the last decade China faces more difficulties in reducing the rural poverty 
(Chen and Ravallion, 2007; Riskin, 2004). 90% of poverty is still rural in China (World Bank, 
2009). The welfare and poverty effects associated with the expansion of high standards food 
sector are therefore potentially very important. Third, both the agricultural commodity and 
factor markets are under transition. Whereas the commodity market is becoming more and 
more efficient (Huang and Rozelle, 2006), factor markets imperfections remain important. 
Therefore, China provides a very interesting case for research on the interaction between the 
food system transition and the acute equity and poverty problem under conditions of market 
imperfections. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
As discussed in the introduction, the findings of the previous literature suggest that the 
expansion of the high standards food affects the GDP growth and income distribution through 
various channels. Although, by focusing on a particular channel provides detailed insights of 
that particular channel, the partial equilibrium approach, which dominates the previous 
literature on food standards, has important drawbacks for interpreting the results and for 
drawing policy conclusions. In particular, it is essential to measure and integrate the impact 
on other commodity markets and on factor markets in order to fully capture the welfare 
effects. 
In order to address the limitations associated with the partial equilibrium framework, the 
present paper adopts a general equilibrium setting for studying the impacts of the expansion 
of the high standards food on household welfare. Our model follows the tradition of applied 
general equilibrium models pioneered by Shoven and Whalley (1984), although its precise 
specification is more closely allied to the CGE models described in de Janvry and Sadoulet 
(2002), and Stifel and Thorbecke (2003). 7 
 
 
2.1. A canonical model 
The structure of this type of models is as follows. The economy consists of N households 
indexed by c, M commodities indexed by i and J factors indexed by j. Let P be a vector of 
prices. The commodity demands can be derived from the first order conditions of household 
utility-maximization: 
                      max   s.t.  cc c
ij Up X p V                               ( 1 )  
where  c U  is household utility,  c X  and  c V  denote commodity demand and factor 
endowment for the cth household;  i p  and  j p  are the corresponding commodity and factor 
prices. 
Households’ demand for consumption goods is a function of their disposable income and 
the vector of consumer prices. Household incomes are determined by their ownership of 
production factors and returns to the production factors. 
As usual, consumer preferences and production technologies are specified in nested 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES). The intermediate sectors are specified to produce 
goods with a CES function of rural labor, land and capital. Final food production combines 
intermediate inputs and the bundle of primary factors (other than intermediate inputs), 
aggregated through a CES function with a sub-nest of a Cobb-Douglas (CD) function for the 
two types of labor. The gross output of the other commodities sector is a CES function with a 
sub-nest of a CD function for labor. 
Profit maximization yields factor demands: 
                       (,) ii i
jj j VV p Q                                       ( 2 )  
where  i
j V  and  i Q   are factor demand and output of industry i respectively. 
The total demand and supply of factors, goods and intermediate products must be equal 8 
 
in equilibrium. The general equilibrium solution can be described by a set of prices 
* p  and 
activity levels 
* X  such that demands equal supplies and no production activity makes 
positive profits: 
                       ic
i QX                                         ( 3 )  
                       (,,)0 ii
ij Qpp                                     ( 4 )  
The aggregate consumer price index (CPI) and the aggregate producer price index (PPI) 
are defined as a sum of composite prices ( m PQ ) weighted by the value shares of final goods 
( m  ) and the sum of producer prices ( m PI ) weighted by the value shares of output ( m  ), 
respectively. 
                           
* mm
m
CPI PQ  
                          
(5a) 
                           
* mm
m
PPI PI  
                          ( 5 b )  
The market for foreign exchange equilibrates via adjustments of the net export, with 
fixed foreign exchange rates. Pressures to adjust export or import quantities (and hence, 
demand and supply of foreign currency) are therefore equilibrated by adjustments in the trade 
surplus.
2   The economy is connected to the rest of the world through trade. The 
substitutability between the imported and the domestic goods is determined on the 
consumption side through a CES aggregation function (Armington 1969), and on the 
production side through a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. The relative 
prices of foreign goods are determined by world market prices and the exchange rate. 
In order to model savings and investment, we make the following three widely used 
assumptions: (1) savings are determined by exogenous constant rates for households; (2) 
                                                        
2  This is compatible with Chinese situation even though this assumption has no important impact on results. In 
fact, if savings do not enter households’ utility function, then fixing either the exchange rate or the trade balance 
is the same right approach for welfare analysis, since it prevents an arbitrary shift away from savings towards 
current consumption from being confused with a welfare improvement. 9 
 
private investment is savings driven; and (3) investment spending is allocated to commodities 
in fixed proportions.
3 For simplicity and data paucity, we further assume that only the final 
commodities are used as investment goods. Total savings equal total investments. 
Following de Janvry and Sadoulet (2002), the nominal exchange rate is used as a 
numeraire. This ensures that only relative prices matter.
4 Households’ welfare (
c W ) is 
measured by real income, which is nominal income (
c Y ) normalized by a 
households-specific price index (
c P ): 








                                ( 6 )  
To measure inequality, we calculate a Gini coefficient using the trapezium rule
5: 




1( ) * ( ) ,
cc c c
c
GN N Y Y c C


    
                      
(7) 
where 
c N  and 
c Y are the cumulated proportions of population and income respectively. 
 
2.2. Integrating Standards and Market Imperfections 
In order to incorporate the key features of food standards and their linkages to the rest of 
the economy, we extend the canonical CGE model along several dimensions. First, given that 
differentiated goods are important for studying the impact of standard expansion, we follow 
Banerjia and Jain (2007) and extend the canonical CGE model by introducing two types of 
vertically differentiated goods in the food sector:
6 low standards food and high standards 
food. Second, to allow for differential effects among rural households, we explicitly model 
                                                        
3 Following Dewatripont and Michel (1987), this neoclassical closure is the most common one in comparative 
static CGE models and widely used in the literature (e.g., de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2002). 
4  As stated by de Janvry and Sadoulet (2002), the choice of numeraire has no impact on real income effects, but 
has impact on decomposition of real income effects, which should be born in mind to explain the simulation 
results. 
5 For this we make use of the trapezium rule which is an approximate technique for calculating the definite 
integral of Gini coefficient. In our case, the trapezium rule is applicable since the income distribution of 
representative households are not continuous. (Cruz-Uribe and Neugebauer, 2002) 
6 The same extensions can be straightforwardly implemented also to other sectors. However, for the sake of 
simplicity, these extensions are not presented here. 10 
 
the heterogeneity of farms. Third, in order to study the impact of rural credit market 
imperfections, which are very important in many developing countries, we follow Harris 
(1984) and introduce credit constraint for rural households. Finally, in order to trace 
rural-urban effects of the high standards food expansion, an inter-regional CGE approach of 
Kilkenny (1993), Ando and Takanori (1997), and Kancs (2001) is adopted with labor market 
imperfections. Figure 1 and Table 1 summarize the model structure. 
Accounting for the dual farm structure characteristic to many developing countries, there 
are two types of rural producers in the model: households (C) (which will be further 
separated in sub-groups) and corporate farms (CF).
7  On the consumer side, in order to study 
the distributional consequences of standards, we distinguish between urban and rural 
households, and rural households are further disaggregated into several income groups. There 
are four types of factor inputs: rural labor ( LR ), urban labor (LU ), capital (K ) and land ( A ), 
with rural households (CR) owning three types of them: rural labor, land and capital, while 
urban households (CU) owning urban labor and capital. Net wages of workers in rural region 
are assumed to be lower than wages of workers in urban region, even though rural workers 
migrate to urban areas. The wage differences can be explained by different skills of different 
labor types and by migration costs (Stifel and Thorbecke, 2003). 
The detailed modeling of different types of rural producers and consumers allows us to 
decompose the aggregate income effects of the high standards food expansion, which are 
crucial for policy recommendations. This disaggregation allows us to isolate the effects on 
urban and rural households, and rural households are further disaggregated into two groups 
by their income level: the “poorest” and the “other” rural households. We define ‘the poorest’ 
and ‘the other’ rural households according to the stratification of the national statistics 
                                                        
7 To avoid confusion between notations for households and high standards, we use capital ‘C’ and ‘H’ to 
indicate households and high standards respectively. Later, to differentiate with activity set, noted as ‘I’, we use 
‘O’ as the notation for the industrial sector. We use ‘LF’/‘HF’ and ‘L’/‘H’ for low/high standards final food and 




Five commodities are produced in the economy, three of which are final goods: low standards 
food (LF) and high standards food (HF) and other commodities (O).
9  There are two types of 
agricultural intermediate products: low standards (L) and high standards (H), which are 
exclusively used by their respective food processing sectors to produce the respective final 
food. 
We assume that high standards food is a luxury good compared to low standards food 
products. Accordingly, household consumption is modeled by the following system:
10 
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(8c) 
subject to the households budget constraint: 





P Xm p s Y c C     
where 
c
m a   is the commodity share parameter in the households consumption function, 
c mps  
the saving rate for households and 
c    a parameter determining the degree of preference for 
low standards food. A smaller 
c    means a larger preference for high standards food. 
Factor use in the production of these commodities will be affected by specific investment 
                                                        
8 The households’ quintile with lowest income in the national statistical data is regarded as the “poorest” rural 
households. The other four quintiles with higher income are grouped together to represent the other rural 
households. Hence, the share of the poorest rural households in the whole population is 11.4%. In the base year 
the poorest rural households had an average income per capita of 2090.02 Yuan while the other rural households 
5677.81 Yuan. 
9  The underlying model is not limited to the selected four sectors, it can be straightforwardly expanded to n 
sectors. However, given that they would add little insights to our question, while unnecessary complicating the 
analysis, the rest of the economic activities are aggregated into one sector ‘other commodities’. 
10  This is a modified Linear Expenditure System derived from Stone-Geary utility function (Stone, 1954). ‘This 
demand system has the advantage of specifying non-discretionary and discretionary expenditure.’ (Savard, 
2005) 12 
 
requirements and market imperfections. In order to produce high standards intermediate 
product, farms face fixed investment cost to satisfy the standards requirement (Farina and 
Reardon, 2000; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). Following Harris (1984) and without loss of 
generality, we assume that these fixed investment costs are a mixture of rural labor ( ) and 
capital ( ). In the simulations later, we analyze the effects of alternative assumptions on 
fixed costs. 
Rural households are often credit constrained (see e.g., Barham et al., 1996; Swinnen and 
Gow, 1999). We assume that, because of rural credit market imperfections, rural households 
and corporate farms face credit constraints in their production for the high standards 
intermediate product market. To model this we assume that the supply of capital to farms for 
high standards production (
c
H K ) is constrained as follows:
11 
                         ,
c cc
H K rcC RC F
                             (9) 
where 
c   is  the  collateral, r   the price of capital, and 
c    the capital supply elasticity. 
In order to decompose the aggregate labor market effect into rural and urban impacts, we 
model the labor market as two separate sub-markets (rural and urban labor) with different 
skill composition. Migration between rural and urban regions is subject to iceberg migration 
costs,   , with 01  . Thus,  / UR wr wr   , where  U wr  and  R wr  are wages for rural 
workers working in urban and rural regions respectively. 
All sectors have zero profit as in the canonical CGE model except the high standards 
intermediate sector, where rural households and corporate farms may earn positive profits if 
credit constraints limit their production capacity to satisfy the market. This reflects the 
investment costs of high standards production, which may be prohibitive for poor rural 
households (Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2003). 
                                                        
11  We only cite the most critical equations in our model while keep the set of all equations in Table 1. 13 
 
More specifically, rural households and corporate farms’ profits (
c  ) in high standards 
intermediate sector are given by the value-added net of factors payments: 
  (, , ) ( ) ( ) ,
cc c c c c c c c
HH H H H R H H H PX f LR A K wr LR tA r K c CR CF              (10) 
Profits of corporate farms are transferred to employed factors proportionally to their 
value shares in production.
12 Rural households’ net income (
c Y ) is therefore the sum of its 
profit in high standards farming, factor incomes and profits from corporate farms, while the 
urban households’ income is only composed of factor incomes and profits: 
           
+,  
+ ,                   
cc cc c C F
R c
cc c C F
wr LR tA rK c CR
Y
wuLU rK c CU


        
                     
(11) 
where 
c    is the endogenous share parameter of transferred profit from corporate farms. 
3. Empirical Implementation 
Two types of parameterization techniques are adopted in the present study. All key 
parameters are estimated econometrically or taken from the literature. The remaining 
parameters are calibrated within the model. 
Empirically, one of the most crucial issues is to identify the “high standards” 
commodities in the baseline, because there are no reliable data for China. For example, Hu, et 
al (2004) estimated that roughly 30% of food was sold through supermarkets. Large 
wholesale and retail companies, as defined by the Chinese Economic Yearbook (CEYC, 
2006), have sold 8.7% of total food. However, according to Wang et al. (2009), nearly all of 
these products came through semi-traditional supply channels and production systems. For 
this reason, in the present study we follow expert judgments and assume that high standards 
production is still minimal and not particularly linked with specific commodities. We make 
                                                        
12 The actual distribution of profits among factors depends on the bargaining power of factor owners. In fact, 
because the profit is not a big amount comparing with the overall factor incomes, our assumption will have no 
significant impact on the empirical results except in simulation 3C, where profit of corporate farms increase 
sharply. 14 
 
the working assumption that 5% of all commodities are “high standards”. This assumption is 
used consistently across production systems, investment activities, etc. for the baseline model. 
Using a rather small share (5%) assumption implies that the size of the effects will be small. 
However, this is not a problem since in this exercise we are primarily interested in the 
direction and the relative size of different sub-effects. Furthermore, in simulations and 
sensitivity analyzes, we analyze how variation in investment costs, production technologies, 
elasticities etc. in the high standards sector affect the growth scenario effects. 
Second, all key elasticities are drawn from the literature,
13 and they are subject to 
extensive sensitivity analysis (Appendix B). Table 3 summarizes the elasticities assumed in 
our analyzes. The income elasticities of low standards products are 0.9, 0.4 and 0.1 for the 
poorest and the other rural households, and urban households respectively. Such a structure is 
compatible with the literature and the stylized facts that poor households consume a relatively 
larger share of staple (low standards) food compared to wealthy households (Lipton, 2001). 
On the import side, a relatively low aggregation elasticity between imports and domestically 
produced goods is assumed (0.5) for the other commodities sector. For the food sectors, 
including both low and high standards food, we assume a rather high elasticity of substitution 
(3.0). In addition, on the export side, the level of elasticities of transformation depends on the 
homogeneity of the aggregated sectors (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). Given the large sectoral 
aggregation in our study, we assume intermediate values (1.2) for both low and high 
standards food sectors, and a lower value (0.8) for the other commodities sector.   
Finally, all CES production functions in the top nests have a medium value of 
substitutability among these factors equal to 0.7, 0.15 and 0.9 for intermediate, processing 
and the other commodities sectors, respectively. The choice of relatively small elasticities of 
substitution between intermediate input and other factors is standard in the CGE literature 
                                                        
13  For a review of literature on elasticities, see Ciaian et al., 2002. 15 
 
and caters to the reality (e.g., Wang and Schuh, 2002). The elasticity of substitution among 
primary factors in the CES sub-nest of the processing sectors is equal to 0.8. The price 
elasticities of variable capital supply for the high standards intermediate activities of rural 
households and corporate farms are set at rather moderate levels (0.7, 1.3 and 1.9 for the 
poorest and the other rural households, and corporate farms respectively). 
The remaining parameters are calibrated to the China data for 2005 (see appendix A 
for details). As usual in CGE models, the data base is organized in the form of a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM), which is shown in Table 2. The CGE model is operationalized 
using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software (Brooke et al., 1988).
14 The 




4.1 General Approach 
A consistent modeling of the high standards food expansion implies that the size of the 
high standards food sector cannot be changed exogenously, because in the underlying CGE 
model the supply and demand of all commodities, including the high standards intermediary 
and final products are determined endogenously. Therefore we have to “induce” the 
expansion of the high standards food sector differently. First, we simulate an increase in the 
world price of high standards products (which is exogenous) – a scenario which we refer to as 
“export-led growth” of high standards food. An important factor is the elasticity of 
transformation of the high standards food, i.e., the elasticity of substitution between domestic 
and exported product. Therefore, we simulate an export-led expansion both when the 
                                                        
14  The source code is available from the authors upon request. 16 
 
elasticity of transformation is “normal” (i.e., as in other models) and when it is high 
(scenarios 1A and 1B). Second, we simulate an increase in (domestic) consumer preferences 
for high standards food. This scenario we refer to as “domestic demand growth”. As will 
become clear from the simulations, growth in consumer demand induces import growth of 
high standards food with open trade. Again trade responsiveness plays an important role. 
Therefore we analyze the domestic demand growth scenario with elastic imports (scenario 2A) 
and inelastic imports (scenario 2B). 
A crucial issue in the simulations is the assumption on the technology used by the high 
standards sector in China. As explained above, there are no precise data on the emerging high 
standards sector, because it is just emerging in China, and there is no consensus whether high 
standards farming is relatively labor- or capital-intensive compared to other activities 
(Bijman, 2008; Miyata, et al., 2007; Weinberger and Lumpkin, 2007). Therefore we construct 
a baseline SAM and perform simulations by assuming the same production technology, i.e. 
factor intensities, in high standards and low standards farming.
15 Later, we simulate how 
different production technologies in high standards farming affects the results.
16 The actual 
production structures for each scenario (sets of assumptions) can be found in Table 2. 
Finally, we study the effect of market imperfections. In particular we simulate how the 
results change when credit market constraints are binding.   
In addition to these simulations, we assess the robustness of our results by performing 
sensitivity analysis of the key assumptions on income elasticities of low standards products, 
the elasticities of transformation and substitution in the Armington equations and the 
substitution elasticities in production. The results, which are presented in Appendix B, show 
that our key conclusions are robust to variations in the key parameters. 
                                                        
15 In the initial simulations with the same factor intensities for low and high standards, we use the weighted 
average of the factor shares for all agricultural commodities in China. 
16 When constructing the SAM under assumption that high standards farming is relatively labor (capital) 
intensive, we change labor and capital use in the other commodities sector, so that the SAM keeps its balance. 17 
 
 
4.2 Scenario 1: Export-led growth in high standards 
China has continuously increased its exports of agricultural products and the ratio of 
agricultural trade to agricultural GDP has risen steadily (Huang et al., 2000). According to 
Gulati et al. (2007), an outward-looking trade policy can induce the growth of high quality 
products. The main reason for the rise of high standard products in trade is that exporters are 
forced to meet international standards and safety regulations. These standards are typically 
considerably higher than in developing countries, such as China. 
To study the potential impact of this export-led emergence of high standard farming, 
we exogenously increase the world market price for high standard products,  HF pwe , by 25%. 
The simulation results for the effect of rising international prices of high standard 
commodities are reported in the first column of Table 4. As a consequence of the increase in 
the world market price of HS products, the domestic consumption of HS declines (-59%) 
strongly and that of LS products increases (+0.62%). There is a decline in imports (-77%) and 
growth of exports (+31%) of HS products. There is a rise in the domestic price of HS 
products (+9.31%) and a corresponding increase in production of both HS products (+9.31%) 
and LS products (+0.48%) because growth in the international demand for HS products and 
growth in the domestic demand for LS products leads to increased production of both. Labor 
use increases substantially on all farms (around 15%) and returns to all rural production 
factors increase: between 0.44% (capital) and 1.52% (land). As a consequence, rural 
household incomes increase by 0.14% (for both poor and other households). Urban 
households lose (-0.15%) as their increased wages from increased employment in HS food 
processing are more than offset by increased consumer prices. Notice that the income effects 
are small. The main reason is that the HS sector is small and changes there have relatively 
limited effects on aggregate. Therefore, what is most important here – if one assume that the 18 
 
sector will grow in the future and thus that the size of the effects will become larger – is the 
relative size of the effects. 
However, another reason is relatively limited “pass-through” of world market effects 
on the domestic market. A comparison with simulation 1B shows that these effects are 
strongly depending on the elasticity of transformation between domestic and exported 
products. With a higher elasticity, the increase in prices is much larger: the price of domestic 
HS food is higher (+21%) instead of +7% as in the increase in the (farmgate) price of HS 
intermediate goods (+30% instead of +10%). The output response is stronger both for HS 
food (+26% instead of +9%) and HS farm products (more than 20% compared to less than 
10% on all farms). Labor use on farms increase much more (by more than 40%) and the 
income effects for rural households are more than double: +0.31% compared to +0.14%. 
 
4.3 Scenario 2: Domestic demand growth in high standards 
Simulation 2A models the effect of a growth in domestic preferences for HS food. 
These effects are quite different. Now the substitution between LS and HS food lead to an 
increase in HS food consumption (+178%) but a decline in LS food consumption (-2%). 
However these changes have important implications because most of this increased 
consumption comes from increased imports of HS food (+274%). Domestic production of HS 
food (+24%) and HS intermediate products (+21% to +23%) increase less, while LS 
production falls. Because of the importance of LS production, this leads to a decline for all 
rural factor returns: labor (-1.22%), land (-3.63%) and capital (-1.14%). All rural households 
lose because of this, but the poorest lose less because they own less land and because they 
consume more LS food. Since LS food prices go down, they benefit as consumers. Notice 
that the household income numbers in table 4 reflect real income effects and that we use 
household-specific CPIs to measure these. For example, while the factor price of rural labor 19 
 
declines by 1.22% in simulation 2A, the factor income from labor for the poorest household 
increases by 0.01% because their CPI decrease by more than the labor price, as LS food 
prices (which make up a large share of their expenditures) decline by 1.61%. This is less the 
case for richer households which spend more on HS food whose price increases by more than 
10%. 
Again these results are strongly influenced by the trade effects. In simulations 2B we 
consider the same exogenous change in preferences but with less elastic imports. In this case 
domestic producers benefit more from the increased demand for HS food by domestic 
consumers. In fact, the increased profits from the production of intermediate products for HS 
food more than offset losses from declining prices for LS products. Now rural households 
benefit: their incomes increase slightly: by 0.05% to 0.08%. However in this case urban 
households benefit less from imported HS food. The increase in domestic HS food prices is 
higher (+15% compared to +10%) and the reduction of LS food price lower (-0.32% 
compared to -1.60%). Their net income effects are zero (compared to +0.31%). 
 
4.4 Aggregate effects 
Before turning to sensitivity analyses, let us consider the aggregate effects. In the 
export-led scenario both real GDP (by -0.05% to -0.07%) and inequality decline (Gini 
declines by -0.28% to -0.57%). Hence, the growth in rural incomes with increase 
international HS prices is more than offset by urban consumers losses in terms of total growth, 
but it does lead to a reduction in inequality. The aggregated effects of the domestic growth 
scenario depend on the trade effects. With elastic trade responses, the growth in urban 
household incomes more than offset declines of rural incomes. Hence there is aggregate 
growth (+0.16%) but inequality increases (Gini +0.51%). With inelastic imports, there is still 
growth but now the Gini coefficient goes up (+0.02%) indicating reduced inequality. At first 20 
 
sight, this is surprising since (poorest) rural household incomes increase and (richer) urban 
income do not change. The reason is that the Gini coefficient is calculated in nominal terms 
or, equivalently, using the same CPI for all households. We have therefore also calculated a 
“real Gini” coefficient which uses household specific CPIs, to capture different consumer 
effect. As Table 4 shows, the real Gini is negative (-0.04%), showing a reduction in 
inequality, which reflects the real income changes more correctly. 
 
4.5 Sensitivity analyses 
Figures 2-5 summarize a series of sensitivity analyses (and figures A1 – A4 in 
appendix show the results of further robustness tests). Figures 2 and 3 show the effect of 
differences in technology use in HS farming. Figure 2 shows under the export-led scenario 
how rural households will benefit more (less) if the technology used in HS farming is more 
(less) labor intensive (see also table A1 in Appendix for more details). This effect is strongest 
for the poorest as is reflected in the different curves for poorer and other rural households. 
Similarly, Figure 3 shows (under the domestic growth scenario) how the rural households 
(and especially the poorest) will lose less with more labor intensive HS farming. 
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of credit constraints. A lower (higher) capital supply 
elasticity represents more (less) credit constraints. The figure shows that income effects for 
rural households are lower with stronger credit constraints. Capital market imperfections thus 
limit the potential benefits of HS expansion for farmers. Figure 5 illustrates the effects of 
investment requirements for HS farmers. The simulations show that in particular poor 
farmers are negatively affected by higher investment costs. 
In summary, these sensitivity analysese are consistent with intuition: poor farms 
whose main assets are labor are most likely to gain if the high standards products can be 
produced with labor intensive technologies and less likely if the cost of capital is higher – e.g. 21 
 
because of capital market constraints in particular when investment costs are higher. 
 
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
In this paper we analyze how the expansion of high standards food production affect the 
structural production changes, the incomes of different types of rural and urban households, 
and the rural poverty and equity by using a CGE model with market imperfections. We 
explicitly model credit constraints and its consequences for poverty and equity. In addition, 
we explicitly model households’ preferences for high standards food. We use 2005 data from 
China to calibrate the model and perform three simulations: the effect of an increase in the 
world price of high standards food, an increase urban households’ preference for high 
standards food, and a reduction in credit constraints. 
This paper is the first to show the complex set of factors that will determine growth and 
equity effects of HS growth. First, the simulation results show that poor rural households will 
expand their production of high standards product with the increase of world price for high 
standards food. In this way an expansion in the high standards food sector leads to a 
reduction of poverty and of inequality. Second, expansion of high standards sector resulting 
from domestic preference changes may increase or decrease real incomes of poor rural 
households, and hence increases or decreases inequality (depending on whether HS 
production can compete with HS imports.). Third, the effects are influenced by technology, 
the required investment costs and factor market imperfections. A reduction in credit 
constraints induces an increase in high standards farming and rural households will gain more. 
If the technology used in high standards farming is more labor intensive it will benefit the 
poor more, and vice versa. Fourth, the spillover effects of HS demand growth on other 
product markets (in this in particular LS markets) is important. Since poor rural households 
depend importantly on HS production they may benefit or lose from spillover effects. As we 22 
 
have shown, the effects depend, among others, on where HS demand comes from and from 
substitution between imports and domestic products. 
In summary, our paper shows the importance of analyzing all the relevant effects 
together. The simulation results have shown that the general equilibrium effects can be very 
different from partial equilibrium effects. The overall welfare effects of standards on poor 
rural households are determined by many tradeoffs and hence cannot be analyzed separately. 
Overlooking some effects may lead to biased, and sometimes wrong, policy conclusions. 
References 
Anderson, K., Damania, R. and Jackson, L.A. (2004). Trade, Standards, and the Political 
Economy of Genetically Modified Food. CEPR Discussion Papers 4526. 
Baffes, J. and Vasavada, U. (1989). On the Choice of Functional Forms in Agricultural 
Production Analysis. Applied Economics 21: 1053-1061. 
Barham, B.L., Boucher, S. and Carter, M.R. (1996). Credit Constraints, Credit Unions, and 
Small-Scale Producers in Guatemala. World Development 24: 793-806. 
Besley, T. and Ghatak M. (2007). Retailing Public Goods: The Economics of Corporate 
Social Responsibility. Journal of Public Economics 91: 1645-1663. 
Bijman, J. (2008). Contract Farming in Developing Countries: An Overview. Working Paper. 
Wageningen University. 
Birthal, P.S., Joshi, P.K. and Gulati, A. (2005). Vertical Coordination in High-Value Food 
Commodities: Implications for Smallholders. Discussion Paper No. 85, Markets, Trade, and 
Institutions Division, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Brooke, A., Kendrick, D. and Meeraus, A. (1988). GAMS: A User’s Guide. Redwood City, 
CA: The Scientific Press. 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) (2008). Decision of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Significant Issues in 
Promoting Rural Reform and Development. (in Chinese) 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/8194418.html accessed on Oct 31, 2008. 
Chen, S. and Ravallion, M. (2007). Absolute Poverty Measures for the Developing World, 
1981-2004. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 
104: 16757-16762. 
China Economy Yearbook Committee (CEYC). (2006). China Economy Yearbook. Beijing: 
China Economy Yearbook Committee. 23 
 
China National Bureau of Statistics (CNBS). (2006). China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: 
China Statistics Press. 
China Ministry of Agriculture (CMA). (2006). China Agriculture Yearbook. Beijing: China 
Agriculture Press. 
Ciaian, P., Swinnen, J. and Münch, W. (2002). The Impact of the Common Agricultural 
Policy on Income Distribution and Welfare in Central and Eastern European Countries. 
Lisbon: 5
th International Workshop on European Economy. 
Copeland, B.R. and Taylor, M.S. (1995). Trade and Transboundary Pollution. American 
Economic Review 85: 716-737. 
Cruz-Uribe, D. and Neugebauer, C.J. (2002), Sharp Error Bounds for the Trapezoidal Rule 
and Simpson's Rule. Journal of Inequalities in Pure and Applied Mathematics 3: 1-22. 
De Janvry, A. and Sadoulet, E. (2002). World Poverty and the Role of Agricultural 
Technology: Direct and Indirect Effects. Journal of Development Studies 38: 1-26. 
Dewatripont, M. and Michel, G. (1987). On Closure Rules, Homogeneity and Dynamics in 
Applied General Equilibrium Models. Journal of Development Economics 26: 65-76. 
Dolan, C. and Humphrey, J. (2000). Governance and Trade in Fresh Vegetables: The Impact 
of UK Supermarkets on the African Horticulture. Journal of Development Studies 37: 
147-176. 
Dries, L., Germenji, E., Noev, N. and Swinnen, J. (2009). Farmers, Vertical Coordination, 
and the Restructuring of Dairy Supply Chains in Central and Eastern Europe. World 
Development: forthcoming. 
Dries, L., and Swinnen, J. (2004). Foreign Direct Investment, Vertical Integration and Local 
Suppliers: Evidence from the Polish Dairy Sector. World Development 32: 1525-1544. 
Farina, E. and Reardon, T. (2000). Agrifood Grades and Standards in the Extended Mercosur: 
Their Role in the Changing Agrifood System. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
82: 1170–1176. 
Fischer, R. and Serra, P. (2000). Standards and Protection. Journal of International 
Economics 52: 377-400. 
Fulponi, L. (2007). The Globalization of Private Standards and the Agri-food System. In 
Swinnen, J. (eds). Global Supply Chains, Standards, and the Poor, Oxford: CABI 
Publications. 
Fulton, M. and Giannakas, K. (2004). Inserting GM Products into the Food Chain: The 
Market and Welfare Effects of Different Labeling and Regulatory Regimes. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 86: 42 – 60. 
Gale, F. and Huang, K. (2007). Demand for Food Quantity and Quality in China. Economic 
Research Report. No. 32. USDA. 24 
 
Gardner, B. (2003). US Food Quality Standards: Fix for Market Failure or Costly 
Anachronism? American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85: 725-730. 
Gulati, A., Minot, N., Delgado, C. and Bora, S. (2007). Growth in High-Value Agriculture in 
Asia and the Emergence of Vertical Links with Farmers. In Swinnen, J. (eds). Global Supply 
Chains, Standards, and the Poor, Oxford: CABI Publications. 
Hallward-Driemeier, M., Wallsten, S. and Xu, L. C. (2003). The Investment Climate and the 
Firm: Firm-Level Evidence from China. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. No. 
3003. 
Harris, R. (1984). Applied General Equilibrium Analysis of Small Open Economies with 
Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition. American Economic Review 74: 1016-1032. 
Henson, S., Loader, R., Swinbank, A., Bredahl, M. and Lux, N. (2000). Impact of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures on Developing Countries. The University of Reading Working 
Paper. 
Hertel, T. (1999). Applied General Equilibrium Analysis of Agricultural and Resource 
Policies. Purdue University Staff Paper, 99-2. 
Hu, D., Reardon, T., Rozelle, S., Timmer, P. and Wang, H. (2004). The Emergence of 
Supermarkets with Chinese Characteristics: Challenges and Opportunities for China’s 
Agricultural Development. Development Policy Review 22: 557-586. 
Huang, J., Wu, Y., Zhi, H. and Rozelle, S. (2008). Small Holder Incomes, Food Safety and 
Producing, and Marketing China’s Fruit, Review of Agricultural Economics. 30: 469-479. 
 
Huang, J. and Rozelle, S. (2006). The Emergence of Agricultural Commodity Markets in 
China. China Economic Review 17 : 266–280. 
Huang, J., Rozelle, S. and Zhang, L. (2000). WTO and Agriculture: Radical Reforms or the 
Continuation of Gradual Transition. China Economic Review 11: 397-401. 
Humphrey, J., McCulloch, N. and Ota, M. (2004). The Impact of European Market Changes 
on Employment in the Kenyan Horticulture Sector. Journal of International Development 16: 
63 - 80. 
Jaffee, S. and Henson, S. (2004). Standards and Agro-Food Exports from Developing 
Countries: Rebalancing the Debate. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3348. 
Jin, S., Zhou, J. and Ye, J. (2008). Adoption of HACCP System in the Chinese Food Industry: 
A Comparative Analysis. Food Control 19: 823-828. 
Key, N., and Runsten, D. (1999). Contract Farming, Smallholders, and Rural Development in 
Latin America: The Organization of Agroprocessing Firms and the Scale of Outgrower 
Production. World Development 27: 381-401. 
Krugman, P. and Venables, A. (1995). Globalization and the Inequality of Nations. Quarterly 25 
 
Journal of Economics 110: 857-880. 
Lipton, M. (2001). Reviving Global Poverty Reduction: What Role for Genetically Modified 
Plants? Journal of International Development 13: 823-846. 
Maertens, M., Colen, L. and Swinnen, J. (2008). Globalization and Poverty in Senegal: A 
Worst Case Scenario? LICOS Discussion Paper. No. 217/2008. 
Maertens, M. and Swinnen, J. (2009). Trade, Standards, and Poverty: Evidence from Senegal. 
World Development 37: 161–178. 
McCluskey, J. (2007). Public and Private Food Quality Standards: Recent Trends and 
Strategic Incentives. In Swinnen, J. (eds). Global Supply Chains, Standards, and the Poor, 
Oxford: CABI Publications. 
Ministry of Health of the People’s Republic of China (MHPRC). (2006). China Hygiene 
Statistic Yearbook. Beijing: Peking Union Medical College Press. 
Minot, N. and Ngigi, M. (2004). Are Horticultural Exports a Replicable Success Story? 
Evidence from Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire. EPTD/MTID Discussion Paper, International Food 
Policy Research Institute. 
Minten, B., Randrianarison, L. and Swinnen, J. (2007). Global Retail Chains and Poor 
Farmers: Evidence from Madagascar. World Development, forthcoming. 
Miyata, S., Minot, N. and Hu, D. (2007). Impact of Contract Farming on Income: Linking 
Small Farmers, Packers and Supermarkets in China. IFPRI Discussion Paper 00742. 
Washington, DC: IFPRI. 
Otsuki, T., Wilson, J. S. and Sewadeh, M. (2001). Saving Two in a Billion: Quantifying the 
Trade Effect of European Food Safety Standards on African Exports. Food Policy 26: 
495–514. 
People Bank of China (PBC) (2006). Operation Report of Chinese Regional Finance. (in 
Chinese) Series of Report of Monetary Policy Execution of China. 
Ravallion, M. (2001). Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages. World 
Development 29: 1803-1815. 
Reardon, T., Codron, J-M., Busch, L., Bingen, J. and Harris, C. (2001). Global Change in 
Agrifood Grades and Standards: Agribusiness Strategic Responses in Developing Countries. 
International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 2: 421–435. 
Reardon, T. and Timmer, C.P. (2005). Transformation of Markets for Agricultural Output in 
Developing Countries Since 1950: How Has Thinking Changed? In Evenson, R., Pingali, P. 
and Schultz, T.P. (eds), Handbook of Agricultural Economics (Vol 3A): Agricultural 
Development: Farmers, Farm Production, and Farm Markets. Holland: Elsevier. 
Reardon, T., Timmer, C.P., Barrett, C.B. and Berdegue, J. (2003). The Rise of Supermarkets 
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85: 26 
 
1140-1146. 
Riskin, C. (2004). The Fall in Chinese Poverty: Issues of Measurement, Incidence and Cause. 
Keith Griffin Festschrift Conference at Political Economy Research Institute, University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst. 
Ronald-Holst, D.W., Reinert, K.A. and Shiells, C.R. (1992). North American Trade 
Liberalization and the Role of Nontariff Barriers. In Economy-wide modeling of the 
Economic implications of a FTA with Mexico and a NAFTA with Canada and Mexico. 
Washington, DC: U.S. International Trade Commission. 
Rozelle, S. and Swinnen, J. (2004). Success and Failure of Reform Insights from the 
Transition of Agriculture. Journal of Economic Literature 42: 404-456. 
Savard, L. (2005). Poverty and Inequality Analysis within a CGE Framework: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Representative Agent and Microsimulation Approaches. 
Development Policy Review 23: 313-31. 
Shoven, J. and Whalley, J. (1992). Applying General Equilibrium, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
St-Hilaire, F. and Whalley, J. (1983). A Microconsistent Equilibrium Data Set for Canada for 
Use in Tax Policy Analysis. Review of Income and Wealth 29: 175-204. 
Stifel, C. and Thorbecke, E. (2003). A Dual-dual CGE Model of an Archetype African 
Economy: Trade Reform, Migration and Poverty. Journal of Policy Modeling 25: 207–235. 
Stone, R. (1954). Linear Expenditure System and Demand Analysis: An Application to the 
Pattern of British Demand. The Economic Journal 64: 511-527. 
Swinnen, J. (ed.) (2007). Global Supply Chains, Standards and the Poor: How the 
Globalization of Food Systems and Standards Affects Rural Development and Poverty, 
Oxford: CABI publishing. 
Swinnen, J. and Gow, H.R. (1999). Agricultural Credit Problems and Policies During the 
Transition to a Market Economy in Central and Eastern Europe. Food Policy 24: 21-47. 
Swinnen, J., Rozelle, S., Xiang, T. and Vandemoortele, T. (2008). A Theory of 
Standards-Driven Rural Development. LICOS Discussion Paper. No. 199/2008. 
Swinnen, J. and Vandemoortele, T. (2008). The Political Economy of Nutrition and Health 
Standards in Food Markets. Review of Agricultural Economics 30: 460 – 68. 
Swinnen, J., Vandeplas, A. and Maertens, M. (2009). Liberalization with Endogenous 
Institutions: A Comparative Analysis of Agricultural Reform in Africa, Asia, and Europe. 
LICOS Discussion Paper. No. 233/2009. 
Trefler, D. (1995). The Case of Missing Trade and Other Mysteries. American Economic 
Review 85: 1029-1046. 27 
 
Trela, I., Whalley, J. and Wigle, R. (1987). International Trade in Grain: Domestic Policies 
and Trade Conflicts. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 89: 271-283. 
Turrini, A. and Van Ypersele, T. (2002). Traders, Courts, and the Home Bias Puzzle. 
Discussion Paper. University of Bergamo. 
Unnevehr, L. (2000). Food Safety Issues and Fresh Food Product Exports from LDCs. 
Agricultural Economics 23: 231-240. 
Wang, H., Dong, X., Rozelle, S., Huang, J. and Reardon, T. (2006). Producing and Procuring 
Horticultural Crops with Chinese Characteristics: A Case Study in the Greater Beijing Area. 
CCAP Working Paper, Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Institute of Geographical 
Sciences and Natural Resource Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China. 
Wang, Z. and Schuh, E. (2002). The Emergence of a Greater China and Its Impact on World 
Trade: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis. Journal of Comparative Economics 30: 
531 – 66.   
Weatherspoon, D.D., Cacho, J. and Christy, R. (2001). Linking Globalization, Economic 
Growth and Poverty: Impacts of Agribusiness Strategies on Sub-Saharan Africa. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 83: 722 – 29. 
Weatherspoon, D.D. and Reardon, T. (2003). The Rise of Supermarkets in Africa: 
Implications for Agrifood Systems and the Rural Poor. Development Policy Review 21: 
333-356. 
Weinberger, K. and Lumpkin, T.A. (2007). Diversification into Horticulture and Poverty 
Reduction: A Research Agenda. World Development 35: 1464–1480. 
World Bank. (2005). Food Safety and Agricultural Health Standards: Challenges and 
Opportunities for Developing Country Exports. Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Trade Unit and Agricultural and Rural Development Department. Report no. 
31207. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
Xinhua Net. (2008). Rolling Report on Sanlu Babies and Infants Milk Powder Event (in 
Chinese). http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/12/content_9935963.htm accessed 
on March 1, 2009. 
Zhai, F. (2008). Armington Meets Melitz: Introducing Firm Heterogeneity in a Global CGE 
Model of Trade. Journal of Economic Integration 23: 575- 604. 
Zhao, Y. (1999). Labor Migration and Earnings Differences: The Case of Rural China. 




The structure and characteristics of China’s economy are shown in Table 2. The System 
of National Accounts and its related data sets for China provide the starting point for our 
dataset of 2005, which is also the latest available dataset. Most data are collected from China 
Statistics Yearbook (CNBS, 2006). For those that can’t be found from the yearbook, we 
complement from other sources, like China Agriculture Yearbook (CMA, 2006) and the 
Input/output Table 2002.
17 
Essentially the procedure required to produce our data set involves extensions, 
modifications and redefinitions of concepts for portions of the national accounts data; the 
addition of further detail to this system; and final adjustments between blocks of data in order 
to restore mutual consistency. As we have stated that the concept of standards includes so 
many aspects that we cannot differentiate exactly which food belongs to high standards or not. 
Hence, we only make some approximation to describe a rough figure. 
A.1 Production 
GDP is 18.67 trillion Yuan and divided into the final commodity sectors: low and high 
standards food, and the other commodity sector. The shares of rural households and corporate 
farms in the high standards farming are estimated according to their farming areas. 
The parameters in production functions are determined by using either cost/revenue table 
or the input/output table according to the availability of data. The cost/revenue tables for the 
agriculture are used to calculate the contribution rates of low and high standards farming 
under our following assumption: Since the profit rate of contract farming is larger than that of 
non-contract farming from the sample data of Miyata et al. (2007), the difference (11.2%) is 
treated as the positive profit for high standards farming in our case. And we proxy the 
                                                        
17 The input/output tables of China are edited once per five years. The Input/output Table 2002 is, hence, the 
latest available table. 29 
 
input/output of both high standards and low standards intermediate product by the weighted 
average of agricultural products including wheat, maize, rice tobacco, tea, peanut, sugar cane, 
beet and apple, etc.The contribution rates of factors in the processing sector are calculated 
from the Input/output Table 2002 (CNBS, 2006). The labor wages, amortization and 
intermediate input of construction sector are proxies of contributions of labor, capital and 
land. The wages in processing and industrial sectors are divided into rural and urban labor 
according to the aggregate ratio of rural to urban labor revenues. 
A.2 Households income, savings/investment and consumption 
From the expenditure side, GDP is divided into consumption, investment and net export. 
All the aggregate amounts can be found in the GDP structure from the yearbook. The 
disaggregate data of households are collected from the income and expenditure structures of 
individual households. 
The investment and net export are added up to the amount of savings. The individual 
households savings are calculated as income less consumption. However, the calculated 
saving rates seem too low, probably because of lack of treatment of government and 
corporate savings, and are enlarged to suit the aggregate saving amount according to their 
relative shares. The investments are sorted into the final commodity sectors according to their 
shares in input/output table. 
The division of income between rural
18  and urban households is based on the income per 
capita and ratio of population. The consumption structures are calculated from the 
expenditure of households. Engel indices are used to divide food and non-food consumptions. 
                                                        
18 Rural Households, according to the explanation of the yearbook, refer to usual resident households in rural 
areas. ‘Usual resident households in rural areas are households residing on a long term basis(for more than one 
year) in the areas under the administration of township governments (not including county towns), and in the 
areas under the administration of villages in county towns. Households residing in the current addresses for over 
one year with their household registration in other places are still considered as resident households of the 
locality. For households with their household registration in one place but all members of the households having 
moved away to make a living in another place for over one year, they will not be included in the rural 
households of the area where they are registered, irrespective of whether they still keep their contracted land.’ 
(CNBS, 2006) 30 
 
The expenditure on food is divided into consumptions of low and high standards food. The 
poorest rural households and urban households are assumed to consume the largest shares of 
low standards food (99.9%) and high standards food (6.7%) respectively. The consumption 
ratios of the other rural households are calculated by inserting numbers proportionally so that 
the overall consumption is equal to production minus investment. 
As far as the households income structures are concerned, the yearbook only divides 
income data into four parts: Income from wages and salaries, from households operations, 
from properties, and from transfers. The divisions among these items of income are not very 
clear and can’t be easily sorted into factor income and profit. We deal with them as follows: 
Income from wages and salaries is treated as wages and income from properties as capital 
income straightforwardly. Income from transfers is excluded since there is no government in 
our model. The most important income for rural households is the income from households 
operations. It is sorted into profit and factor incomes, including those from labor, from land 
and from capital, which are added into other factor incomes to get the final income structures 
of rural households. Even though the statistical income from operations includes other 
activities, like transportation, we use its total amount as proxy to farming operations since we 
cannot differentiate them. As for urban households, its income from wages and salaries is 
treated as income from labor. And the incomes from households operations and from 
properties are added up to income from capital.
19 
Because of transportation cost of migration between rural and urban regions, the wages 
earned in the two regions are different. The gap between wage of rural labor working in 
urban region (8520 Yuan according to PBC, (2006)) and average income
20  per labor in rural 
region (6948 Yuan) is treated as the iceberg costs. The implicit assumption under the use of 
                                                        
19 Even though the migrants from rural to urban may keep their rights in the rural land, we don’t count it in 
because of the unavailability of data. 
20  Because all the incomes earned by rural households are attached to their operations in rural activities, they are 
the best alternative choice to wages earned in urban area.   31 
 
income per labor in rural as the comparison base is that rural labor make the decision of 
migration by comparing it with wage in urban region. 
A.3 External sector 
All final commodities are tradable and have both export and import. 
A.4 ‘RAS’ adjustments
21 
After the adjustments, modifications and additions listed above are completed, the 
remaining inconsistencies in our data set involve major data blocks which need to be 
realigned so as to satisfy (or restore in certain cases) equilibrium conditions. 
In the ‘RAS’ procedure a non-negative matrix which does not initially meet prescribed 
non-negative row and column sum constraints is restored to a situation of consistency 
through a sequence of alternating operations on rows and columns of the matrix. First row 
constraints are satisfied, then column constraints, then row constraints, and so on until a 
consistent matrix is achieved. The sums of prespecified row and column constraints must be 
the same since they both provide the matrix sum. If the matrix is everywhere dense, 
convergence is assured. 
After the ‘RAS’ procedure, the GDP as a whole only increases 0.7%. The largest 
modification is to decrease the consumption of high standards food for urban households by 
57.8%. This may be a signal that we have no precise data on high standards food 
consumption and that high standards food consists of a very small part of the whole economy 
and is more vulnerable to change. Considering the limited data availability against intensive 
use of data, such scale of data modification is thought to be acceptable. 
                                                        
21  This method is referred to St-Hilaire and Whalley (1983). 32 
 
B. Sensitivity analysis 
In order to assess the robustness of our results we perform sensitivity analysis of the 
key assumptions.
22  First, our results are robust to alternative assumptions on income 
elasticities of low standards products (   1.35, 0.9, 0.45
RP
LF     for the poorest rural 
households, and structural modification of elasticities for the other households). 
Second, alternative choices of the elasiticities of transformation (   0.6, 1.2, 1.8
t
LF   , 
  0.6, 1.2, 1.8
t
HF    and    0.4, 0.8, 1.2
t
O   ) and the elasticities of substitution 
(   1.5, 3.0, 4.5
q
LF   ,    1.5, 3.0, 4.5
q
HF    and    0.25, 0.5, 0.75
q
O   ) yield only 
marginal changes to our comparative static results in the simulations of trade and credit 
constraints, while they have some impacts on the simulations of preference changes. The 
reason why the simulation results of preference change are sensitive to different assumptions 
of elasticities in trade lies in the fact that higher values of elastisities of substitution between 
domestic and foreign markets will benefit those consumers and producers who are highly 
involved in the outward-oriented sector. 
  Third, alternative choices of the substitution elasticities between factors 
(   0.35, 0.7, 1.05
s
R   ,   0.075, 0.15, 0.225
s
po   ,    0.4, 0.8, 1.2
s
PS    and 
  0.45, 0.9, 1.35
s
O   ) yield only small changes in the results for the simulations of trade 
and credit constraints. They do have some significant impacts on the simulations of 
preference changes. But the signs of the effects do not change. For example, increasing these 
substitution elasticities will decrease the income of the poorest rural households more (from 
-0.09% to -0.13%), decrease the income of the other rural households less (from -0.16% to 
-0.15%) and increase the income of urban households less (from +0.31% to +0.29%). 
In summary, our results are robust to variations in all these parameters.
                                                        
22  A full set of sensitivity analyzes results is available from the authors upon request. 33 
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Figure 3. Domestic demand growth with elastic import under different technologies (Baseline 




Figure 4. Export-led expansion with different credit constraints (Baseline = Simulation 1A) 
 
 







Figure A1. Export-led expansion with different income elasticities 
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Table 1 The Model 
Production and factor demand   
(, , ) bb b b b QX CES LR A K     (A1) 
(( , ) , ) OO O L O OO QX CES CD LR LU K     (A 2) 
(( ( , ) , , ) , ) po po poS poL po po po po po QX CES CES CD LR LU A K QXI      (A 3) 
,
c cc
H K r c CR CF       (A 4) 
*(, , , ) LL L R LRL R P X w r t r    (A 5) 
*(, , ; ) ,
cc c
HH H R H LR LR PX wr t K c CR CF     (A 6) 
*(,, , , ) pop o R p o Ll Ll wr wu t r PXI    (A 7) 
*(, , , ) OOO U LlL l P X w r w u r    (A 8) 
*(, , , ) LL L R A AP Xw r t r    (A 9) 
*(, , , ; ) ,
cc c
HH H R H A AP Xw r t r Kc C RC F     (A 10) 
*(,, , , ) pop oR p o A Aw r w u t r P X I    (A 11) 
*(, , , ) LL L R K KP X w r t r    (A 12) 
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*(, , , ) OO O U K KP X w r w u r    (A 14) 
*(,, , , ) pop o R p o X Xw r w u t r P X I    (A 15) 
Income and demand   
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* mm PE pwe EXR    (A 27) 
*** mm mm m m PQ QQ PD QD PM QM    (A 28) 
*** mm mmmm PX QX PD QD PE QE    (A 29) 
* mm
m
CPI PQ     (A 30) 
* mm
m
PPI PI     (A 31) 
Equilibrium conditions   
(a) Demands equal supply for factors  
** * / cc
ip o U
iB p o cC RC F cC R
LRL R L R L 
 
     
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ip o
iB p o cC
A AA

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** * cc c
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KK K K K 
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     
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X QINV QQ     (A 36) 
po po X QXI    (A 37) 
(c) Current account balance for ROW (in domestic currency)   
** mm m m
mm
PE QE PM QM FSAV     (A 38) 
   
Endogenous variables     
R wr ,  U wr ,  wu ,  t ,  r   Price of factors 
i PX   Producer price of activity i 
po PXI   Producer price of intermediate product 
m PQ   Price of composite good 
m PD   Price of domestically produced good for domestic market 
m PE   Export price in domestic currency 
c    Profit for high standards farming to agent c 
c    Endogenous share parameters of transferred profit from corporate 
farms 
i LR ,  i LU ,  i A ,  i K   Demand of factor from activity i 
po X   Demand of intermediate input from processing sector po 
* c
m X   Consumption of commodity m by households c 
i QX   Domestic production 
po QXI   Production of intermediate input in processing sector po 
m QQ   Domestic demand for composite good 
m QD   Domestic demand for domestically produced good 
m QE   Export 
c Y   Income of households c 
c
b YF   Factor income of households c from factor b 44 
 
IADJ  Investment adjustment factor 
QINVm  Quantity of investment demand for commodity m 
FSAV  Foreign savings (domestic currency) 
CPI  Aggregate consumer price 
PPI  Aggregate producer price 
Exogenous variables and coefficients 
i    Efficient parameter of activity i for different level of nests 
, c cC RC F      Collateral of agent c in high standards farming   
c
m a   Share parameter of households consumption spending on commodity 
m 
m pwe     Export price for m (foreign currency) 
m pwm     Import price for m (foreign currency) 
m    Weight of commodity m in the CPI 
m    Weight of commodity m in the PINDEX 
c LR ,  c LU ,  c A ,  c K   Households endowment 
   Migration cost rate 
c mps   Marginal (and average) propensity to save for households c 
m qinv   Baseline quantity of fixed investment demand 
q
m    Armington elasticities of substitution 
t
m    Elasticities of transformation 
c 
  Fixed costs in the form of rural labor 
c 
  Fixed costs in the form of capital 
Numeraire  
EXR  Exchange rate (dom. Currency per unit of for. Currency) 
Functions   
CES  Constant elasticity of substitution function 
CD  Cobb-Douglas function 
CET  Constant elasticity of transformation function 
Indices and sets   
i  Index for activities,  iI   
b  Index for intermediate sectors  bBLH     
po  Index for processing sectors  poP LP H    
j  Index for factors,  j J   
l  Index for labor categories,  lL RL U    
c  Index for agents,  cCC O    
m  Index for commodities,  mM   
 45 
 
Table 2. Archetype SAM of China when the same technology is used in high standards and low standards farming 
















Land  Capital LaborRCFP  LandCFP  Capital
CFP 
cfpro  High 
inter. 
Poorest rural  Other 
rural  
Urban  S-I  ROW 
Low inter.                  23104.2                                                       
High poorest                                                              14.0             
High other                                                              207.7             
High corp.                                                              11.7             
Low proc.                                                                  1933.7  14358.2 12512.8  2227.7  1416.8 
High proc.                                                                  3.0  40.4  242.5  119.3  176.0 
Other com.                                                                  2163.2  25835.2 36797.7  77173.0  42412.5 
Rural labor  10514.2  5.7  83.9  4.7  1359.1  13.7  29105.5                                       
Urban labor                2365.2  40.9  82926.2                                               
Land  4362.9  2.3  34.8  2.0  1523.3  15.4                                           
Capital  8227.2  4.4  65.7  3.7  2876.9  29.1  40037.2                                       
LaborRCFP                                      0.6                         
LandCFP                                            0.2                         
CapitalCFP                                            0.5                         
cfpro            1.3                                                       
High inter.                233.4                                                             
Poorest rural    1.6                      3727.5   370.7    0.05  0.02                             
Other rural        23.3                  37359.3   5570.1 18471.8 0.5  0.2  0.2                           
Urban                                85332.2   32772.4     0.3                           
S-I                                                  0.0  21191.4 68551.6         
ROW                1220.8  248.9  32312.7                                            10223.0     
total  23104.2  14.0  207.7  11.7  32449.5  581.3  184381.6 41086.8 85332.2 5940.8 51244.2 0.6  0.2  0.5  1.3  233.4  4099.9  61425.3 118104.6 89743.0  44005.3 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on China’s yearbooks and input/output table. 46 
 
Table 3. Parameters applied in the model 
  Intermediate 
product  Final food  Other commodities
Elasticity of factor substitution 0.7  0.15 (Agg.); 
0.8 (Sub-nest)  0.9 
Armington elasticity of substitution -  3.0  0.5 
Elasticities of transformation -  1.2  0.8 
Poorest rural  Other  rural  Urban 
Income elasticity of low standards food 0.9    0.4  0.1 
Poorest-high  Other-high Corporate  farms 




Table 4. Simulation results: The same technology in high standards and low 
standards farming (Percentage change comparing with baseline) 
Sim 1A: World price of high standards food increase by 25% (
/2 5 % PH PH pwe pwe   , 
/2 5 % PH PH pwm pwm   ); Elasticity of transformation of high standards food is normal (
1.2
t
PH   ). 
Sim 1B: World price of high standards food increase by 25% (
/2 5 % PH PH pwe pwe   , 
/2 5 % PH PH pwm pwm   ); Elasticity of transformation of high standards food is large ( 20
t
PH   ). 
Sim 2A: Urban households’ preference for low standards food decrease by 25% 
( / 25% UU    ); Import is elastic (
3
q
PH   ). 
Sim 2B: Urban households’ preference for low standards food decrease by 25% 
( / 25% UU    ); Import is inelastic ( 0.1
q
PH   ). 








Aggregate  effects      
Real GDP  -0.05  -0.07  0.16    0.03 
CPI 0.48  0.95  -1.09    -0.17 
Gini coefficient  -0.28  -0.57  0.51  0.02 
Real Gini coefficient  -0.25  -0.53  0.40  -0.04 
Consumptions      
Low standards food  0.61  1.03  -2.19  -0.73 
High standards food  -58.58  -99.95  178.22  50.38 
Other commodities  0.05  0.11  -0.07  0.01 
Output of final commodities         
Low standards food  0.48  0.79  -1.91  -0.68 
High standards food  9.31  25.79  24.29  24.66 
Other commodities  -0.12  -0.22  0.33  0.08 
Individual output of high standards 
intermediate product 
    
Poorest rural households  7.58  20.93  20.75  20.59 
Other rural households  8.95  24.71  23.19  23.58 
Corporate farms  9.06  24.83  21.84  22.88 
Trade      
Import  volume      
Low standards food  2.65  5.08  -6.84  -1.68 
High standards food  -77.73  -99.97  274.11  52.23 
Other commodities  0.25  0.50  -0.52  -0.08 
Export  volume      
Low standards food  -0.32  -0.76  0.01  -0.30 
High standards food  31.24  130.48  0.96  0.45 
Other commodities  -0.41  -0.80  1.01  0.21 
Rural labor used in high standards 
intermediate product 
    
Poorest rural households  14.74  44.23  38.89  43.83 48 
 
Other rural households  16.21  48.73  45.35  47.40 
Corporate  farms  15.42 46.82 43.07 46.56 
Domestic consumer price         
Low standards food  0.67  1.31  -1.61  -0.32 
High standards food  1.64  2.97  10.37  14.55 
Other commodities  0.39  0.78  -0.90  -0.17 
Company food price         
Low standards food  0.67  1.31  -1.60  -0.32 
High standards food  7.33  21.27  18.92  19.72 
Other commodities  0.37  0.73  -0.84  -0.16 
Farm gate price         
Low standards intermediate product  0.69  1.35  -1.65  -0.33 
High standards intermediate product    10.23  30.00  27.67  28.35 
Factor  price      
Rural labor  0.54  1.07  -1.22  -0.22 
Urban labor  0.27  0.55  -0.56  -0.08 
Land 1.52  2.96  -3.63  -0.71 
Capital 0.44  0.85  -1.14  -0.27 
Poorest rural households           
Profit effect from high standards farming  0.03  0.10  0.11  0.11 
Profit sharing from corporate farm  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01 
Factor income effect  0.10  0.20  -0.21  -0.03 
Among  it:        
Labor  0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Land 0.09  0.17  -0.22  -0.04 
Total income effect  0.14  0.31  -0.09  0.08 
Other rural households         
Profit effect from high standards farming  0.03  0.10  0.11  0.11 
Profit sharing from corporate farm  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Factor income effect  0.10  0.20  -0.27  -0.07 
Among  it:        
Labor 0.03  0.05  -0.05  -0.00 
Land 0.09  0.17  -0.23  -0.05 
Capital -0.02  -0.03  0.00  -0.02 
Total income effect  0.14  0.31  -0.16  0.05 
Urban  households      
Profit sharing from corporate farm  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Factor income effect  -0.15  -0.28  0.31  -0.00 
Among  it:        
Labor -0.14  -0.26  0.34  0.04 
Capital  -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
Total income effect  -0.15  -0.28  0.31  0.00 
Source: Authors’ simulation. 49 
 
Table A1. Export-led expansion under different technologies ( /2 5 % PH PH pwe pwe    and 
/2 5 % PH PH pwm pwm   ) 
Sim 3A. 15% of the baseline labor is used in high standards farming. 
Sim 3B. 150% of the baseline labor is used in high standards farming. 
  Sim 3A.  Sim 3B. 
Aggregate effects     
Real GDP  -0.04  -0.05 
CPI   0.46  0.52 
Gini coefficient  -0.25  -0.31 
Consumptions    
Low standards food  0.64  0.53 
High standards food  -60.87  -53.69 
Other commodities  0.04  0.05 
Output of final commodities     
Low standards food  0.52  0.39 
High standards food  3.15  22.44 
Other commodities  -0.11  -0.13 
Individual output of high standards 
intermediate product 
  
Poorest rural households  2.07  18.04 
Other rural households  2.77  22.22 
Corporate farms  3.02  22.10 
Trade    
Import volume     
Low standards food  2.59  2.75 
High standards food  -79.09  -75.14 
Other commodities  0.23  0.26 
Export volume     
Low standards food  -0.23  -0.47 
High standards food  22.93  47.05 
Other commodities  -0.39  -0.45 
Rural labor used in high standards 
intermediate product 
  
Poorest rural households  8.92  25.78 
Other rural households  9.65  30.23 
Corporate farms  9.92  30.11 
Domestic consumer price     
Low standards food  0.64  0.73 
High standards food  1.67  1.58 
Other commodities  0.37  0.43 
Company food price     
Low standards food  0.63  0.72 
High standards food  7.34  7.30 
Other commodities  0.35  0.40 
Farm gate price     
Low standards intermediate product  0.65  0.75 
High standards intermediate product    10.26  10.17 
Factor price     
Rural labor    0.50  0.62 
Urban labor    0.26  0.29 50 
 
Land 1.46  1.63 
Capital 0.43  0.45 
Poorest rural households       
Profit effect from high standards 
farming 
0.03 0.03 
Profit sharing from corporate farm  0.00  0.00 
Factor income effect  0.08  0.13 
Among it:       
Labor -0.00  0.04 
Land 0.08  -0.02 
Total income effect  0.11  0.17 
Other rural households     
Profit effect from high standards 
farming 
0.03 0.03 
Profit sharing from corporate farm  0.00  0.00 
Factor income effect  0.09  0.12 
Among it:       
Labor 0.01  0.04 
Land 0.08  0.09 
Capital -0.01  -0.01 
Total income effect  0.12  0.16 
Urban households     
Profit sharing from corporate farm  0.00  0.00 
Factor income effect  -0.14  -0.16 
Among it:       
Labor -0.13  -0.15 
Capital -0.00  -0.00 
Total income effect  -0.14  -0.16 
Source: Authors’ simulation. 